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11 Introduction and Preliminaries
This paper deals with a vector optimization problem and its dual variables (Lagrange multi-
pliers or shadow prices) that we want to investigate in details. To this aim, we present some
scalarization methods and, subsequently, the interpretation of dual variables is given by means
of sensitivity analysis. We propose also a scheme to derive marginal rates of substitution be-
tween two diﬀerent objective functions and also between an objective and a constraint. The
setting is the linear case; in fact, it is the simplest to operate in at the beginning of the work,
but obviously our intent is to propose in the future similar results in a more general framework
and to focus also on duality arguments.
The paper deals mainly with scalarization methods. As it is well known, under convexity as-
sumptions, a weighting scalarization technique permits to ﬁnd all the optimal solutions of a
vector optimization problem.
Otherwise, without any assumption on the given problem, a way of scalarizing consists in the
construction of ℓ scalar problems - as many as the objective functions - called ε-constraint prob-
lems (see (3.2.1) of [11]).
Another scalarization method, without any assumption, is proposed in [9]. All the optimal points
of the vector minimum problem are found by solving a scalar quasi-minimum problem, that, in
the linear case, reduces to establish whether or not a parametric system of linear inequalities has
a unique solution that is exactly the value of the parameter; a necessary and suﬃcient condition
is given, which allows us to obtain this result. We also will point out some relationships between
the two above methods.
The paper is organized as follows. In Sect.2, we present the scalarization techniques and some
results about them; then, we describe a way to ﬁnd all the optimal solutions of a vector opti-
mization problem. Sect.3 is devoted to the study of shadow prices. Starting from a complete
vector Lagrangian function, through scalarization and sensitivity analysis, we can derive two
matrices of marginal rates of substitution, or rates of change; the former, call it Θ, refers to the
rates of change between two objectives; the latter, call it Λ, refers to the rates of change between
an objective and a constraint. In Subsect.3.1, we obtain these matrices trough the ε-constraint
method and we prove that the matrix Θ is reciprocal and consistent; in Subsect.3.2, we obtain
these matrices by means of the scalarization technique proposed in [9] and we point out the
relationships between these two methods. The properties and the relations between Θ and Λ
2are then outlined. All these aspects are discussed in Sect.4 through examples.
In the remaining part of this section, we recall the notations and basic notions useful in the
sequel. On denotes the n-tuple, whose entries are zero; when there is no fear of confusion the
subﬁx is omitted; for n = 1, the 1-tuple is identiﬁed with its element, namely, we set O1 = 0.
Let the positive integers ℓ,m,n, the cone C ⊆ Rℓ, the vector-valued functions f : Rn → Rℓ
and g : Rn → Rm and the subset X ⊆ Rn be given. In the sequel, it will be assumed that C
be convex, closed and pointed with apex at the origin (so that it identiﬁes a partial order) and
with intC  = Ø, namely with nonempty interior. Set C0 := C\{O}. We consider the following
vector minimization problem, called generalized Pareto problem:
minC0 f(x) subject to x ∈ K = {x ∈ X : g(x) ≥ O}, (1.1)
where minC0 denotes vector minimum with respect to the cone C0: x0 ∈ K is a (global) vector
minimum point (for short, v.m.p.) to (1.1), if and only if
f(x0)  C0 f(x), ∀x ∈ K, (1.2)
where the inequality means f(x0) − f(x) / ∈ C0. In what follows, we will assume that v.m.p.
exist. Obviously, x0 ∈ K is a v.m.p. of (1.1), i.e (1.2) is fulﬁlled, if and only if the system (in
the unknown x)
f(x0) − f(x) ∈ C, f(x0) − f(x)  = O, g(x) ≥ O, x ∈ X (1.3)
is impossible. System (1.3) is impossible if and only if H ∩ K(x0) = Ø, where H := C0 × Rm
+
and K(x0) := {(u,v) ∈ Rℓ × Rm : u = f(x0) − f(x), v = g(x), x ∈ X}. In the sequel, when
there is no fear of confusion, K(x0) will be denoted merely by K. H and K are subsets of
Rℓ × Rm, that is called image space; K is called image of problem (1.1). In general, to prove
directly H ∩ K(x0) = Ø is a diﬃcult task; hence this disjunction can be proved by means of a
suﬃcient condition, that is the existence of a function, such that two of its disjoint level sets
contain H and K, respectively. To this end, let us consider the sets U = C0, V = Rm
+ and
U∗
C0 := {Θ ∈ Rℓ×ℓ : Θu ≥C0 O, ∀u ∈ U}, V ∗
C := {Λ ∈ Rℓ×m : Λv ≥C O, ∀v ∈ V }. Let us
introduce the class of functions w : Rℓ × Rm → Rℓ, deﬁned by:
w = w(u,v,Θ,Λ) = Θu + Λv, Θ ∈ U∗
C0, Λ ∈ V ∗
C (1.4)
where Θ,Λ play the role of parameters. For every vector-valued function of family (1.4) the
positive and nonpositive level sets are given by:
3WC0(u,v;Θ,Λ) = {(u,v) ∈ Rℓ × Rm : w(u,v,Θ,Λ) ≥ C0};
WC0(u,v;Θ,Λ) = {(u,v) ∈ Rℓ × Rm : w(u,v,Θ,Λ)   C0}.
Proposition 1.1. (see Proposition 1 of [9]) Let w be given by (1.4). We have H ⊂ WC0,
∀Θ ∈ U∗
C0, ∀Λ ∈ V ∗
C.
Proposition 1.1 is a ﬁrst step towards a suﬃcient condition for the optimality of x0. It is obvious
that, if we can ﬁnd one of the functions of class (1.4) such that K(x0) ⊂ WC0, then the optimality
of x0 is proved. Indeed, we have the following result.
Theorem 1.1. (see Theorem 1 of [9]) Let x0 ∈ K. If there exist matrices Θ ∈ U∗
C0,Λ ∈ V ∗
C,
such that
w(f(x0) − f(x),g(x),Θ,Λ) = Θ(f(x0) − f(x)) + Λg(x)  C0 O, ∀x ∈ X, (1.5)
then x0 is a (global) v.m.p. of (1.1).
If C = Rℓ
+, then (1.1) becomes the classic Pareto vector problem and (1.2) is the deﬁnition of
Pareto optimal point.
At ℓ = 1 and C = R+, the above theorem collapses to an existing one for scalar optimization
(see Corollary 5.1 of [7]). Observe that the identity matrix of order ℓ, say Iℓ, belongs to U∗
C0
and that, when ℓ = 1, Θ can be replaced by 1.
2 Scalarization of Vector Problems
There exist many scalarization methods; we recall here those ones exploited in this work to
deepen the study of shadow prices.
A) Weighting method (see (3.1.1), Part II of [11]).
Problem (1.1), where C = Rℓ




wifi(x) subject to x ∈ K, (2.1)
where the wi are weighting coeﬃcients, such that wi ≥ 0 ∀i,
 ℓ
i=1 wi = 1.
Classical results are represented by the following propositions (see [11]).
4Proposition 2.1. A minimum point of problem (2.1) is Pareto optimal if the weighting coeﬃ-
cients are positive, that is wi > 0, ∀i = 1,...,ℓ.
Proposition 2.2. If there exists a unique minimum point of problem (2.1), then it is Pareto
optimal.
Proposition 2.3. Let (1.1) be convex. If x0 ∈ K is Pareto optimal, then there exists a weighting
vector w (wi ≥ 0, i = 1,...,ℓ,
 ℓ
i=1 wi = 1), such that x0 is a minimum point of (2.1).
B) ε-constraint method (see (3.2.1), Part II of [11]).
Problem (1.1), when C = Rℓ
+, is associated with the following ℓ scalar problems:
Pk(ε) : minfk(x) s.t. fj(x) ≤ εj ∀j  = k, x ∈ K; k = 1,...,ℓ, (2.2)
where εj is an upper bound for function fj with j = 1,...,ℓ. For the proofs of the following
results we refer to [11].
Proposition 2.4. A vector x0 ∈ K is Pareto optimal if and only if it is a minimum point of all
problems Pk(ε), ∀k = 1,...,ℓ, at εj = fj(x0) for j = 1,...,ℓ, j  = k.
Therefore it is possible to ﬁnd every Pareto optimal solution to (1.1) by the ε-constraint method.
Further results are the following ones.
Proposition 2.5. A point x0 ∈ K is Pareto optimal if it is the unique minimum point of an
ε-constraint problem for some k with εj = fj(x0) for j = 1,...,ℓ, j  = k.
Proposition 2.6. The unique minimum point of the kth ε-constraint problem, i.e. Pk(ε), is
Pareto optimal for any given upper bound vector ε = (ε1,...,εk−1,εk+1,...,εℓ).
Proposition 2.7. Let x0 ∈ K be a minimum point of (2.1) and wi ≥ 0, ∀i = 1,...,ℓ; we have:
i) if wk > 0, then x0 is a solution to Pk(ε) for εj = fj(x0), with j = 1,...,k, j  = k;
ii) if x0 is the unique solution to (2.1), then x0 is a solution to (2.2) for εj = fj(x0).
Moreover, if (1.1) is convex and x0 ∈ K is a minimum point of (2.2) and εj = fj(x0) for
j = 1,...,ℓ, j  = k, then there exists a weighting vector wi ≥ 0, ∀i = 1,...,ℓ, with
 ℓ
i=1 wi = 1,
such that x0 is also a minimum point of (2.1).
5Finally, we will shortly recall the scalarization approach proposed in [9] for solving vector opti-
mization problems.
C) Scalarization by Separation.
In [9] it has been shown how to set up a scalar minimization problem, which leads to detect
either all the v.m.p. of (1.1) or merely only one.
For every y ∈ X, let us deﬁne the following set:
S(y) := {x ∈ X : f(x) ∈ f(y) − C}.
Then, let us consider any ﬁxed p ∈ C∗ := {z ∈ Rn :  z,x  ≥ 0,∀x ∈ C} and introduce the
(scalar) quasi-minimum problem (in the unknown x):
min  p,f(x) , s.t. x ∈ K ∩ S(y), (2.3)
whose feasible region depends on the parameter y.
We stress the fact that, in what follows, unlike y, p will not play the role of a parameter and
will be considered ﬁxed. Observe that, if C = Rℓ
+, then S(y) = {x ∈ X : f(x) ≤ f(y)}, so that
S(y) is a (vector) level set of f.
As it will be clear in the sequel, it is interesting to ﬁnd conditions under which the set K ∩S(y)
(which obviously contains y) is a singleton.
Proposition 2.8. K ∩ S(x0) = {x0} if and only if x0 is a v.m.p. of (1.1) and ∄x ∈ K\{x0}
such that f(x) = f(x0).
Proof. K ∩ S(x0) = {x0} if and only if
f(x0) − f(x) / ∈ C, ∀x ∈ K\{x0}, (2.4a)
or, equivalently,
f(x0) − f(x) / ∈ C ⇐⇒ f(x0) − f(x) / ∈ C0 and f(x0) − f(x)  = O. (2.4b)
Then (2.4) is equivalent to claim that x0 is a v.m.p. of (1.1) and f(x0)  = f(x), ∀x ∈ K\{x0}.
The scalarization approach of [9] is based on the results expressed by the following propositions.
Proposition 2.9. Let any p ∈ intC∗ be ﬁxed. Then x0 is a v.m.p. of (1.1), if and only if it is
a (scalar) minimum point of (2.3) at y = x0.
6Proposition 2.10. If x0 is a (global) minimum point of (2.3) at y = y0, then x0 is a (global)
minimum point of (2.3) also at y = x0.
Proposition 2.10 suggests a method for ﬁnding a v.m.p. of (1.1). Let us choose any p ∈ intC∗;
p will remain ﬁxed in the sequel. Then, we choose any y0 ∈ K and solve the (scalar) problem
(2.3) at y = y0. We ﬁnd a solution x0. According to Proposition 2.9, x0 is a v.m.p. of (1.1).
If we want to ﬁnd all the v.m.p. of (1.1) – this happens, for instance, when a given function
must be optimized over the set of all v.m.p. of (1.1) – then, starting with y = x0, we must
parametrically move y ∈ K and maintain y itself as a solution to (2.3). Propositions 2.9 and
2.10 guarantee that all the solutions to (1.1) will be reached. Note that such a scalarization
method does not require any assumption on (1.1).
This method is proposed also in [17] and [3], and problem (2.3) is sometimes called “hybrid
problem” (see (3.3.1), Part II of [11]), but in [9] the results are obtained, by means of separation
arguments, independently of [17] and [3]. The following example shows the application of the
above scalarization approach.
Example 2.1. Let us set ℓ = 3, m = 1, n = 2, X = R2, C = R3
+ and
f1(x) = x1 + 2x2, f2(x) = 4x1 + 2x2, f3(x) = x1 + 3x2, g(x) = −|x1| + x2.
Choose p = (1,1,1) and y0 = (0,1). Then (2.3) becomes:
min(6x1 + 7x2), s.t. − |x1| + x2 ≥ 0, x1 + 2x2 ≤ 2, 2x1 + x2 ≤ 1, x1 + 3x2 ≤ 3. (2.4)
The (unique) solution to (2.4) is easily found to be x0 = (0,0). Because of Proposition 2.9, x0
is a v.m.p. of (1.1) in the present case. Furthermore, we have K ∩ S(x0) = {x0}, namely the
parametric system (in the unknown x):
−|x1| + x2 ≥ 0, x1 + 2x2 ≤ y1 + 2y2, 2x1 + x2 ≤ 2y1 + y2, x1 + 3x2 ≤ y1 + 3y2 (2.5)
has the (unique) solution x0. In order to ﬁnd all the v.m.p. of (1.1), we have to search for all
y ∈ K, such that (2.5) has y itself as the (unique) solution. (2.5) is equivalent to

   
   
|x1| ≤ x2 ≤ −1
2x1 + 1
2y1 + y2





7Due to the simplicity of the example, it is easy to see, by direct inspection, that y ∈ R2 is the
unique solution to (2.6), if and only if y1 + y2 = 0,y1 ≤ 0 or
y = (y1 = −t,y2 = t), t ∈ [0,+∞),
which gives us all the v.m.p. of (1.1).
We wish to propose a general method for solving the problem of ﬁnding the unique solution to
K ∩ S(x0), but this is not a simple matter. Meanwhile let us introduce a way to do this in the
linear case. First of all, we suppose to have a non-parametric system.
Theorem 2.1. Given a matrix A ∈ Rm×n and a vector b ∈ Rm, a bounded and nonempty











, ∀i ∈ J := {1,...,n}, (2.7)
where c1,...,cn ∈ Rn are ﬁxed linearly independent vectors.
Proof. The necessity is trivial. The suﬃciency is proved ab absurdo: if ∃x1,x2 ∈ P with x1  = x2,
then two cases are possible for ˆ x := x2 −x1: either ˆ x is orthogonal to every ci, i ∈ J, or ∃h ∈ J
such that ˆ x is not orthogonal to ch. In the former case, we have ˆ x = O, because ˆ x is orthogonal
to n linearly independent vectors; hence x1 = x2 which contradicts the assumption. In the latter











for x = ˆ x and ci = ch. Finally, we conclude that P is a singleton.


































is the set of parameters y we are looking for to obtain as unique solution to K ∩ S(x0), y = x0.
Note that Y  = Ø if and only if R(y) is a singleton; moreover, the following theorem gives a
suﬃcient condition to have Y = Ø.




≥ 0 i = 1,...,m+ℓ}  = {O},
then Y = Ø.




≥ 0 i = 1,...,m + ℓ, i.e., ¯ Aˆ x ≥ O. From
R(y)  = Ø follows ∃˜ x ∈ R(y) such that ¯ A˜ x ≥ ¯ By+¯ b. Let us consider the vectors ˜ x+αˆ x, ∀α > 0;
we have ¯ A(˜ x+αˆ x) ≥ ¯ By+¯ b and hence, since ˆ x  = O, ˜ x+αˆ x is an element of R(y) for any choice
of α. We have found that R(y) is not a singleton, and from Theorem 2.1 and Remark 1, follows
Y = Ø.
In other words we have proved that if the positive polar cone of the cone generated by the rows
of ¯ A does not collapse to the origin O ∈ Rn, then ∄y ∈ Rn such that it is the unique solution to
the system ¯ Ax ≥ ¯ By +¯ b.
3 Shadow Prices
This section aims at carrying on the study of the dual problem of (1.1) and the strictly related
analysis of the shadow prices. A suﬃcient optimality condition, given in Theorem 1.1, states that
x0 ∈ K is a v.m.p. of (1.1) if Θ(f(x0) − f(x)) + Λg(x)  C0 O, ∀x ∈ X, for Θ ∈ U∗
C0, Λ ∈ V ∗
C.
From this condition, and remembering the form for a complete vector Lagrangian function
L : Rn × Rℓ×ℓ × Rℓ×m → Rℓ: L(x;Θ,Λ) := Θf(x) − Λg(x), we can observe that there are
two kinds of dual variables: Λ = (λij), i = 1,...,ℓ, j = 1,...,m is the matrix of Lagrangian
multipliers, where λij denotes the change of the constrained optimal value of the ith objective
function with respect to the level of the jth constraining function, while Θ = (θik), i,k = 1,...,ℓ,
is the matrix of Lagrangian multipliers, where θik denotes the rate of change in the value of
fi when it occurs a change in the value of fk, sometimes called trade-oﬀ. Hence, in Vector
Optimization it is easy to understand the interest not only in studying the rate of change of
every objective function with respect to the movement of any constraint, but also in evaluating,
by means of the dual variables, the rate of change of every objective function with respect to
the change of the other objectives. To this aim, we will study problems (2.2) and the scalar
quasi-minimum problem (2.3). More precisely, we refer to Proposition 2.4 for the ε-constraint
method, and to Proposition 2.9 for the quasi-minimum problem. In both cases, the analysis will
be accomplished in the linear case; nevertheless, since the results of Sect.2 do not require any
assumption on (1.1), it is possible to apply the same arguments to more general cases. Hence,
9let us consider the following positions: C = Rℓ
+; f(x) = Fx, with F ∈ Rℓ×n; g(x) = Ax − b,
with A ∈ Rm×n and b ∈ Rm; X = Rn. ∀i ∈ I, we will denote by Fi the ith row of the matrix
F; problem (1.1) becomes:
min Rℓ
+\{O} Fx, s.t. x ∈ K = {x ∈ Rn : Ax ≥ b}. (3.1)
3.1 Shadow prices by means of ε-constraint method
In the linear case, when ε = Fx0, problems (2.2) become:
Lk(x0) : min Fk,x , s.t. x ∈ {x ∈ Rn : Ax ≥ b, Fi,x  ≤  Fi,x0 ,i ∈ I \ {k}}, k ∈ I.
In the sensitivity analysis, we will assume that x0 be a v.m.p. of (3.1) and hence also of all
problems Lk(x0),∀k ∈ I. Since we are considering the linear case, at least one of the constraints
of problem (3.1) is fulﬁlled as equality at an optimal solution x0; let B ∈ Rn1×n and d ∈ Rn1,
with n1 < m, be the submatrix of A and the subvector of b corresponding to a subset of the
binding constraints at x0. Now, let us pay attention to Lk(x0) for a ﬁxed k ∈ I: suppose that
Bk be a basis corresponding to the solution x0 and that the ﬁrst n1 rows of Bk are those of B










2 is a subset of I \ {k} of cardinality n2. Among all the bases fulﬁlling the above
properties, let us consider only those for which x0 is also a minimum point of the problem:
min Fk,x , s.t. x ∈ Rk := {x ∈ Rn : Bx ≥ d, −Fi,x  ≥  −Fi,x0 ,i ∈ Ink
2}. (3.2)
Observe that, in general, such a property is not maintained for any basis Bk; in the sequel, it
will be understood. Deﬁne the perturbed problem:
min Fk,x , s.t. x ∈ Rk(η;ξ) := {x ∈ Rn : Bx ≥ d+η, −Fi,x  ≥  −Fi,x0 +ξi,i ∈ Ink
2}, (3.3)
where η ∈ Rn1 and ξ ∈ Rnk
2. Now, let us consider the Kuhn-Tucker multipliers of the problem






i = Fk, ˜ λk ∈ R
n1
+ , ˜ ϑk
i ∈ R+, i ∈ Ink
2. (3.4)
10It is well known that they are the derivatives of the optimal value of the function  Fk,x  with




















, i ∈ Ink
2. (3.6)
Recall the following deﬁnitions [13].
Deﬁnition 3.1. Let A be an n × n matrix with non-zero elements. A is said to be reciprocal,
if and only if aij = 1
aji ∀i,j = 1,...,n.
Deﬁnition 3.2. Let A be an n × n reciprocal matrix. A is said to be consistent, if and only if
aijajk = aik ∀i,j,k = 1,...,n.
We have the following results.
Proposition 3.1 (Reciprocity). Let j,k ∈ I be such that for the corresponding problems
Lj(x0) and Lk(x0) there exist two bases Bj and Bk, such that Ink
2 ∪ {k} = In
j
2
∪ {j}. Then, it
results that ˜ ϑk




j is the jth component of the solution ˜ ϑk of (3.4), while ˜ ϑ
j
k is the kth component of the










j and ˜ ϑ
j


















    − Fi,i ∈ Ink
2
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∪{k} is rearranged in such a way that j is replaced



















   




11Since, by assumption, we have Ink
2 ∪ {k} = In
j
2















\ {k} = Ink






   








    − Fi,i ∈ Ink
2

















i.e., that ˜ ϑk
j = 1/˜ ϑ
j
k.
Proposition 3.2 (Consistency). Let j,k,s ∈ I. Consider the problems Lj(x0) and Lk(x0)
having  Fj,x  and  Fk,x  as the objective functions, respectively. Suppose that:

















































Then, it results that ˜ ϑ
j
k˜ ϑk








































































   





Now, calculate ˜ ϑk






   












  − Fi,i ∈ Ink
2
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\ {k} = Ink






































































and hence ˜ ϑ
j
k˜ ϑk
s = ˜ ϑ
j
s.
From statement (3.6) and the thesis of Proposition 3.1 follows the interpretation of the reciprocity
as rule for deriving the inverse function, while from (3.6) and the thesis of Proposition 3.2 the
consistency property can be interpreted as rule for deriving the composed function.
Now, we are in the position to deﬁne the shadow prices matrices Θ and Λ. ∀k ∈ I, let us
consider the problem Lk(x0), and ∀i ∈ Ink
2 solve the corresponding system (3.4). Deﬁne Θ as
the ℓ × ℓ matrix whose diagonal elements are equal to 1 and ϑki = −˜ ϑk
i , i ∈ Ink
2; observe that
the change of sign of ˜ ϑk
i is because of the change of sign in the corresponding constraint in
the calculus of ˜ ϑk
i by means of (3.4). The result expressed by (3.6) justiﬁes the deﬁnition of
“shadow prices matrix” for Θ and gives the following meaning of ϑki: how the kth objective
function depends on the level of the ith one at the optimal solution x0. In general, not all
the elements of the matrix Θ are obtained by means of the above procedure, it is possible to
complete the matrix Θ by imposing that Θ be reciprocal and consistent. From Proposition 3.1
13and Proposition 3.2, it turns out that the elements of Θ deﬁned by the above procedure satisfy
the property of reciprocity and consistency, except for the sign. From these properties follows
also that Θ has null determinant and hence its inverse does not exists. Moreover, starting from
the solution of system (3.4), deﬁne the matrix Λ ∈ Rℓ×n1 of shadow prices corresponding to the
binding constraints Bx ≥ d as the matrix whose kth row is the vector ˜ λkT
, ∀k ∈ I. In this case
too, due to (3.5), the kth row of Λ shows as the kth objective function depends on the levels of
the binding constraints at the optimal solution. Observe that, in general, the matrices Λ and Θ
are not univocally determined.
The following example shows how to calculate the shadow prices matrices Θ and Λ by means of
the procedure just before outlined.
Example 2.1 (continuation). Same data as in Example 2.1, with the sole exception of g, which
is now split into g1(x) = x1 + x2 and g2(x) = −x1 + x2; so that in the present case (1.1)
becomes a linear problem; i.e. (3.1). Choose x0 = (−2,2) as optimal solution to (3.1) and
consider the three problems Lk(x0), k = 1,2,3. Observe that in (3.1) only the constraint g1(x)





, while g2(x) can be disregarded in the problems Lk(x0), k = 1,2,3. It results:
L1(x0) : min(x1 + 2x2), s.t. x1 + x2 ≥ 0, 4x1 + 2x2 ≤ −4, x1 + 3x2 ≤ 4.
There are two bases containing the original constraint x1+x2 ≥ 0 and one between 4x1+2x2 ≤





, then x0 is
again an optimal solution to the sub-problem:
min(x1 + 2x2), s.t. x1 + x2 ≥ 0, 4x1 + 2x2 ≤ −4.
The Lagrangian multipliers ˜ λ1
1, ˜ θ1











it turns out ˜ λ1
1 = 3, ˜ θ1
2 = 1
2; this implies θ12 = −1




, then x0 it is no more an optimal solution to the sub-problem:
min(x1 + 2x2), s.t. x1 + x2 ≥ 0, x1 + 3x2 ≤ 4,
14and hence such a basis is not considered in order to deﬁne the shadow prices matrices Θ and Λ.
Now, consider the problem:
L2(x0) : min(4x1 + 2x2), s.t. x1 + x2 ≥ 0, x1 + 2x2 ≤ 2, x1 + 3x2 ≤ 4.























Therefore, it results ˜ λ2
1 = 6, ˜ θ2
1 = 2; this implies θ21 = −2. Observe that θ12 = 1/θ21.











it results ˜ λ2
1 = 5, ˜ θ2
3 = 1; this implies θ23 = −1. Lastly, let us consider the problem:
L3(x0) : min(x1 + 3x2), s.t. x1 + x2 ≥ 0, x1 + 2x2 ≤ 2, 4x1 + 2x2 ≤ −4.





 maintains the optimality of x0; for such a matrix the











Therefore, it results ˜ λ3
1 = 5, ˜ θ3
2 = 1; this implies θ32 = −1. Observe that θ23 = 1/θ32.
















where * denotes the missing elements. The complete matrix Θ is obtained by putting the
diagonal elements equal to 1 and by applying the properties of reciprocity and consistency.


















15The matrix Λ ∈ R3×1 is not univocally determined because of the two bases associated with
L2(x0); in fact, they give two choices for the second row of Λ. Hence, there are two shadow


























3.2 Shadow prices by means of the Scalarization by Separation
Also in this second approach, we start by the assumption that x0 is a v.m.p. of (3.1) and hence
(see Proposition 2.9) also of the following problem
min pTF,x , s.t. x ∈ {x ∈ Rn : Ax ≥ b,Fx ≤ Fx0}.
Since we are considering the linear case, x0 is an optimal solution to:
min pTF,x , s.t. x ∈ {x ∈ Rn : Bx ≥ d,Fx ≤ Fx0}, (3.8)
where B ∈ Rn1×n and d ∈ Rn1, with n1 ≤ m, are respectively the submatrix of A and the
subvector of b corresponding to a subset of the binding constraints at x0; let us consider a basis




i , i ∈ In2

,
where In2 is a subset of I of cardinality n2, with n1 + n2 = n. Among all the bases fulﬁlling
the above properties, let us consider only those for which x0 is again an optimal solution to the
problem:




Let us consider the problem:
min pTF,x  s.t. x ∈ R(η,ξ) := {Bx ≥ d + η, −Fi,x  ≥
 
−Fi,x0 
+ ξ,i ∈ In2}, (3.9)
16where η ∈ Rn1 and ξ ∈ Rn2. Consider the Kuhn-Tucker multipliers ˜ λS ∈ R
n1
+ , ˜ ϑS
i ∈ R+,i ∈ In2,
of the problem (3.9); they are the solution to the system BTλS −
 
i∈In2 FiϑS
i = pTF; then, as





minx∈R(η,ξ)  pTF,x 
 
∂ηi




minx∈R(η,ξ)  pTF,x 
 
∂ξi
, i ∈ In2.
The following proposition provides an alternative procedure to obtain the same shadow prices
matrix Θ obtained by the ε-constraint method; recall that In2 and ˜ ϑk
j are those of Subsect.3.1.
Proposition 3.3. Given problem (3.9), suppose that there are two bases maintaining the op-





















⊂ I\{j} and Ink
2 ⊂ I\{k} are of cardinality n2 and such that In
j
2
∪ {j} = Ink
2 ∪ {k}.
Then we have ˜ ϑk
j = ˜ ϑS
j /˜ ϑS
k with k,j ∈ In2.


















    − Fi, i ∈ In
j
2

















    − Fi, i ∈ Ink
2
  ,
where pTF substitutes the column vector −Fk in the ﬁrst equality and the column vector −Fj
in the second equality. By observing that the assumption In
j
2
∪ {j} = Ink





















    − Fi, i ∈ Ink
2
  = ˜ ϑk
j
where we recall that that ˜ ϑk
j is the jth component of the solution to system (3.4).
We note that changing the set of indexes of cardinality n2 we get all the elements ϑS
i with
i = 1,...,ℓ.
Moreover, we want to stress that the quantity ˜ ϑS
j /˜ ϑS
k is the quotient between the derivative of
the scalarized function with respect to the jth objective and the derivative of the scalarized
function with respect to the kth objective, it results that it can be thought as the derivative of
the kth objective function with respect to the change of the jth objective, i.e., ˜ ϑk
j.
17Applying the same procedure to the multipliers corresponding to the original binding constraints,
the quantity ˜ λS
t /˜ θS
k, with k ∈ In2, t = 1,...,n1, is the quotient between the derivative of the
scalarized function with respect to the tth constraint and the derivative of the scalarized function










   pTF
 














   pTF
 ,
where pTF substitutes the tth column of BT, and B−tT denotes the matrix BT without its tth
column.
Now we want to emphasize some interesting similarities between solving a vector linear problem
by the ε-constraint method and solving the same problem by the scalarization method proposed
in [9]. In the former case, we have ℓ scalar primal problems, each of them with n variables,
m+(ℓ−1) constraints and hence ℓ dual problems with m+(ℓ−1) variables and n constraints;
in the latter case, we have only one scalar primal problem with n variables, (m + ℓ) constraints
and a dual problem with (m + ℓ) variables and n constraints. Therefore, in the former case,
we have Θ ∈ Rℓ×ℓ and Λ ∈ Rℓ×m that collects all the information given by the ℓ problems and
the ith row of the matrices refers to the ith problem, i ∈ I; while, in the latter case, we have
the vectors θ ∈ Rℓ and λ ∈ Rm which evidently resume the previous results. The continuation
of Example 2.1 elucidates the result of Proposition 3.3 and gives some other hints about the
relationships between these two methods.
Example 2.1 (continuation). Our aim is to highlight diﬀerent aspects of the same problem.
We have a scalarized primal and dual problem and three primal and dual problems by the ε-
constraint method. We set the parameters a = θ12, b = θ13. From Propositions 3.1 and 3.2, we













This kind of matrices Θ ∈ Rℓ×ℓ is deﬁned by ℓ−1 parameters, has a maximum eigenvalue γ = ℓ
with the other eigenvalues equal to zero, and eigenvector ¯ θT = (1
k, 1
ka, 1
kb), ∀k ∈ R\{0}, (see e.g.






1 + 4a + b
(1 + 4a + b)/a










2 + 2a + 3b
(2 + 2a + 3b)/a





Since the dual problems of the ε-constraint method have a feasible region described by 2 equa-
tions and 3 unknowns, thus the parameter to set is only one and we may impose a = 1/2 + b.
One can easily see that the matrix Λ is obtained as follows Λ = ¯ θλ∗T where λ∗
i = cT
i θ, i = 1,2,
and c1 = (1,4,1), c2 = (2,2,3), while Θ = ¯ θθT.
We observe that these matrices satisfy ∀a,b ≥ 0 the suﬃcient optimality condition:
Θ(f(x0) − f(x)) + Λg(x)  C0 O, ∀x ∈ X.
The scalarized primal problem is:
min((p1 + 4p2 + p3)x1 + (2p1 + 2p2 + 3p3)x2)
s.t. x1 + x2 ≥ 0, −x1 − 2x2 ≥ −2, −4x1 − 2x2 ≥ 4, −x1 − 3x2 ≥ −4
and its dual is:
max(−2θ1 + 4θ2 − 4θ3)
s.t. λ1 − θ1 − 4θ2 − θ3 = (p1 + 4p2 + p3), λ1 − 2θ1 − 2θ2 − 3θ3 = (2p1 + 2p2 + 3p3).
The dual feasible region is described by 2 equations and 4 unknowns, so we have 2 parameters to
choose. Call λ1 the unknown related to the original constraint and let θ1,θ2,θ3 be the unknowns
corresponding to the constraints of the feasible region S(x0). Finally, let θT = (k,ka,kb) be the
vector of parameters, that is (θ1,θ2,θ3). From these positions, we can express a feasible λ1 as
λ1 = (1,4,1)(θ + p) or λ1 = (2,2,3)(θ + p).
To understand the relationships between the scalarized problem and the ε-constraint problems
we may proceed by applying Proposition 3.3. We get θS
1 = p1 − 2p2 + p3, θS
2 = −1
2p1 + p2 −
p3, θS
3 = 1




k and hence we may see that the matrix Θ does not depend on the choice of the
parameter p. Alternatively, one can ﬁnd the derivatives of the scalarized objective function with
respect to every constraint. In particular, from the derivatives of the scalarized function with
respect to every objective now converted in constraint, we get the vector θ ∈ R3 from which we
19obtain also the matrix Θ ∈ R3×3 previously found. We suppose that when we move from the
solution x0 = (−2,2) we stay on the direction given by the constraint.
4 Numerical Examples
In this section we propose some examples to explain diﬀerent cases that point out some partic-
ular situations. The ﬁrst one treats a feasible region with 2 binding constraints at x0.
Example 4.1. Let us consider problem (3.1) and the positions: ℓ = 3, m = 2, n = 2












We now apply the ε-constraint method starting from the optimal point x0 = (2
3, 2
3); we get 3
sub-problems:
Li(x0) : min Fi,x , s.t. Ax ≥ b,  −Fj,x  ≥
 
−Fj,x0 
, j  = i; i = 1,2,3.
For every Li(x0),i = 1,2,3, we consider the Kuhn-Tucker multipliers corresponding to the
basis composed by one (of two) original constraints and one (of two) objective functions now
transformed in constraints; hence, we have 4 bases for every single problem. By applying the
procedure of Subsect.3.1, we do not have uniqueness in determining the shadow prices matrix





























Alternatively, we can consider the dual problems of Li(x0),i = 1,2,3. Every dual problems has


















(−3a + b + 5)/3 (3a + b − 4)/3
(−3a + b + 5)/3a (3a + b − 4)/3a





As in Example 2.1, we introduce the scalarized problem:
PS :

   
   
min((p1 − p2 − p3)x1 + (−2p1 + p2 − p3)x2)
−x1 − 2x2 ≥ −2, −2x1 − x2 ≥ −2,




   
   
max(−2λ1 − 2λ2 + 2
3θ1 + 4
3θ3)
−λ1 − 2λ2 − θ1 + θ2 + θ3 = (p1 − p2 − p3),
−2λ1 − λ2 + 2θ1 − θ2 + θ3 = (−2p1 + p2 − p3)
The feasible region of the dual is described by 2 equations and 5 unknowns, so we have 3
parameters to characterize the shadow prices matrices. From this problem we get the feasible
pair:
λ1 = 1
3(−4,3,1)(θ + p) = c1(θ + p) and λ2 = 1
3(5,−3,1)(θ + p) = c2(θ + p).
From these results we can conclude that Λ = ¯ θλ∗T where λ∗
i = cT
i θ, i = 1,2 and Θ = ¯ θθT.
When we move from the solution x0 = (2
3, 2
3), we can choose to remain in the direction given
either by the ﬁrst constraint of K or the second one. Thus, we obtain two vectors θSi, i = 1,2.
In the former case, we have θS1







while in the latter we have θS2











again we may observe that these elements do not depend on vector p.
The aim of the next example is to illustrate the results stated in Proposition 3.3.
Example 4.2. Let us consider (3.1) with the following positions: ℓ = 3, m = 3, n = 3,


























21As starting optimal point, choose x0 = (−2,2,2). Since only the ﬁrst constraint is binding at
x0, then the scalarized problem we consider is:
PS :

   
   
min((p1 + 4p2 + p3)x1 + (2p1 + 2p2 + 3p3)x2 + (−p1 + p2 + p3)x3)
x1 + x2 ≥ 0, −x1 − 2x2 + x3 ≥ 0,
−4x1 − 2x2 − x3 ≥ 2, −x1 − 3x2 − x3 ≥ −6







−4x1 − 2x2 − x3












−x1 − 2x2 + x3











−x1 − 2x2 + x3














































1 = −4, θ3
2 = −3.
While, from ε-constraint method, verifying the optimality condition FT
i (Bi)−1 ≥ 0, and follow-














We observe that Θ is still reciprocal, but it is no longer consistent. In the end we note that,
from the dual of PS we obtain λ = (1,4,1)(θ + p) or λ = (2,2,3)(θ + p) and if we consider




















1 + 4a + b
(1 + 4a + b)/a










2 + 2a + 3b
(2 + 2a + 3b)/a



















22which is the same that we obtain following the other approaches. In fact, in this case, every
subproblem Li(x0) has an optimal basis, that is the optimality condition FT
i (Bi)−1 ≥ 0 is
veriﬁed for all basis Bi,i = 1,...,3.
In the next example, we want to show what may happen when we start the analysis from an
optimal point that binds both constraints.
Example 4.3. Let us consider (3.1) with the following positions: ℓ = 3, m = 2, n = 3,
F1 = (−1,0,0), F2 = (0,−1,0), F3 = (0,0,−1),
A =

 −2 −3 −4
−4 −1 −1







We want to outline three diﬀerent cases of optimal points to start with:
i) the ﬁrst constraint is binding at x1 = (0,0,3);
ii) the second constraint is binding at x2 = (2,0,0);
iii) both constraints are binding at x3 = (6/5,16/5,0).





min(−p1x1 − p2x2 − p3x3)
−2x1 − 3x2 − 4x3 ≥ −12, x1 ≥ 0, x2 ≥ 0, x3 ≥ 3



















































































While, from ε-constraint method, verifying the optimality condition FT


























23We observe that from the direct calculus of the derivatives one gets the same result.





min(−p1x1 − p2x2 − p3x3)
−4x1 − x2 − x3 ≥ −8, x1 ≥ 2, x2 ≥ 0, x3 ≥ 0










































j or from ε-constraint
method, verifying the optimality condition FT
i (Bi)−1 ≥ 0, or from the calculus of the derivatives;






















Case iii). The scalarized problem is:
PS :

   
   
min(−p1x1 − p2x2 − p3x3)
−4x1 − x2 − x3 ≥ −8, −2x1 − 3x2 − 4x3 ≥ −12,
x1 ≥ 6/5, x2 ≥ 16/5, x3 ≥ 0
Both constraints are binding at the point x3 = (6/5,16/5,0), then, if we want to consider all the
constraints of K we can add only one constraint of S(x3) to the basis. All the bases we obtain
are:

















































































































From the ﬁrst group of bases, we cannot construct the matrices Θ and Λ; the other groups are
the same of case i) and ii), hence, even for this point, the pairs (Θ1,Λ1) and (Θ2,Λ2) are the














that collects the information about the variation of one objective function with respect to an-
other, but does not exist a corresponding matrix Λ with all positive elements; in fact, the two


























In this section we want to underscore the main topics of the preceding sections with some ob-
servations and remarks about some results, and open questions.
In the linear case, when only one constraint of K is binding at the starting optimal solution,
we are obliged to move on it when we perturb the original objective functions now converted
in constraints. If the binding constraints are more then one, we have the possibility to choose
which one enters in the basis to consider; this is the case of Example 4.1, where we get therefore
two matrices Θ, while in Example 4.3 we cannot choose the basis with both original constraints,
because it is not optimal.
In connection with this fact, another observation is about the sign of Θ elements. If we are, for
instance, in R2 and we have only one binding constraint, we are bound to move on a line, then
if we take other lines moving on it, the possible directions are only two; we want to say that if
f1 moves in the opposite direction of f2 and of f3, then necessarily f2 and f3 moves in the same
25direction; consequently, if we have θ12 < 0, θ13 < 0, then θ23 > 0. Obviously, if we are in R3 a
binding constraint individuates a plane, and the fact that f1 moves in an opposite direction of
f2 and of f3, does not imply that f2 and f3 move in the same direction, thus the elements of Θ
could be: θ12 < 0, θ13 < 0 and θ23 < 0; this fact renders Θ reciprocal, but not consistent.
Another thorny problem is about the relationship between the matrices of Kuhn-Tucker multi-
pliers and the separating hyperplane. In the scalar case, there exists a correspondence between
the vector of multipliers and the parameters of the separating function. In this context, instead,
the matrices Θ and Λ that we get from the examples do not satisfy the suﬃcient condition (1.5),
moreover they do not deﬁne a separation function as in (1.4). Only if we take the elements of
the matrix Θ in their absolute value, then we can try to verify condition (1.5), since now the
pair (Θ,Λ) is such that Θ ∈ U∗
C\{O}, Λ ∈ V ∗
C.
From these considerations the formalization of a necessary optimality condition is required,
especially given by means of vector separation; this could be matter of future studies.
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